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Abstract. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are becoming essential
to protecting modern information infrastructures. The effectiveness of
an IDS is directly related to the computational resources at its disposal.
However, it is difficult to guarantee especially with an increasing demand
of network capacity and rapid proliferation of attacks. On the other hand,
modern intrusions often come as sequences of attacks to reach some pre-
defined goals. It is therefore critical to identify the best default IDS
configuration to attain the highest possible overall protection within a
given resource budget. This paper proposes a game theory based solu-
tion to the problem of optimal signature-based IDS configuration under
resource constraints. We apply the concepts of indices of power, namely,
Shapley value and Banzhaf-Coleman index, from cooperative game the-
ory to quantify the influence or contribution of libraries in an IDS with
respect to given attack graphs. Such valuations take into consideration
the knowledge on common attack graphs and experienced system attacks
and are used to configure an IDS optimally at its default state by solving
a knapsack optimization problem.
Keywords: Intrusion Detection Systems, IDS Configuration, Coopera-
tive Games, Shapley Value, Banzhaf-Coleman Index.
1 Introduction
The issue of optimal IDS configuration and provisioning has always been difficult
to deal with, mainly due to the overwhelming number of parameters to tune.
IDSs are generally shipped with a number of attack detection libraries (also
known as categories [13] or analyzers [12]) with a considerable set of configu-
ration parameters. The current version of the Snort IDS [13], for example, has
approximately 10,000 signature rules located in fifty categories. Each IDS also
⋆ This work was supported in part by the U.S. Air Force Office of Scientific Research
(AFOSR) under grant number AFOSR MURI FA9550-09-1-0249, and in part by
Boeing Company through the Information Trust Institute of the University of Illinois.
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comes with a default configuration to use when no additional information or ex-
pertise is available. It is not trivial to determine the optimal configuration of an
IDS because it is essential to understand the quantitative relationship between
the wide range of analyzers and tuning parameters. This explains the reason
why current IDSs are configured and tuned simply based on a trial-and-error
approach. Although there have been recent approaches, such as in [15, 18, 20],
to optimize IDS resource consumption, we still need to deal with resource con-
straints and make the best use of an IDS with available resource budgets. On
the other hand, most of current computer attacks do not come in one shot but
in several steps, by which attackers can acquire an increasing amount of knowl-
edge and privileges to attack the target system. To describe such multi-stage
behaviors, attack graphs or trees are commonly used as tools to model secu-
rity vulnerabilities of a system and all possible sequences of exploits used by
intruders.
In this paper, we develop a novel game theory based solution to the problem
of optimal default signature-based IDS configuration under resource limitations.
The solution considers the costs and functionalities of libraries and defender’s
knowledge on common attack graphs to configure an IDS optimally at its default
state.
The contribution of this paper can be summarized as follows. We introduce
the concept of detectability of an attack sequence with respect to a given set of
IDS libraries and devise metrics to measure the detectability and the efficacy
of detection. From a game theoretical perspective, we view a configuration as a
coalition among libraries and apply the indices of power, namely, Shapley value
and Banzhaf-Coleman index, to rank the overall importance of a library for the
purpose of intrusion detection, which can be used in a knapsack problem for
finding the optimal default configuration. In addition, we extend our results to
general attack graphs based on multilinear extension and propose a scheme to
approximate the indices of power when the number of libraries is large.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we sum-
marize some recent related work on IDS configuration and cooperative games.
In Section 3, we define the important notion of detectability and establish a
mathematical model for attackers and detectors. In Section 4, we formulate a
cooperative game framework to evaluate the indices of power for a given attack
sequence. In Section 5, we introduce multilinear extension as a general frame-
work and an approximation technique to evaluate the indices of power. Finally,
in Section 6, we conclude the paper.
2 Related Work
We find a recent growing literature on performance characterization of IDSs in
the computer science community. Some of the related work is summarized as
follows.
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2.1 IDS Performance Evaluation
Gaffney et al. in [4] use a decision analysis that integrates and extends Receiver
Operating Characteristics (ROCs) to provide an expected cost metric. They
demonstrate that the optimal operation point of an IDS depends not only on
the system’s own ROC curve and quantities such as the expected rate of false
positives, false negatives, and the cost of operation, but also on the degree of
hostility of an environment in which the IDS is situated, such as the probability
and the type of an intrusion. Hence, the performance evaluation of an IDS has
to take into account both the defender’s side and attacker’s side.
In [23], a network security configuration problem is studied. A nonzero-sum
stochastic game is formulated to capture the interactions among distributed in-
trusion detection systems in the network as well as their interactions against ex-
ogenous intruders. The authors have proposed the notion of security capacity as
the largest achievable payoff to an agent at an equilibrium to yield performance
limits on the network security, and a mathematical programming approach is
used to characterize the equilibrium as well as the feasibility of a given security
target.
Zhu and Bas¸ar in [22] use a zero-sum stochastic game to capture the dynamic
behavior of the defender and the attacker. The transition between different sys-
tem states depends on the actions taken by the attacker and the defender. The
action of the defender at a given time instant is to choose a set of libraries as
its configuration, whereas the action of the attacker is to choose an attack from
a set of possible ones. The change of configuration from one instant to the next
implies for the defender to either load new libraries or features to the configu-
ration or unload part of the current ones. The actions taken by the attacker at
different times constitute a sequence of attacks used by the attacker. An online
Q-learning algorithm is used to learn the optimal defense response strategies for
the defender based on the samples of outcomes from the game.
In this paper, we address the issues of optimal default configuration, which
is complementary to the one addressed in [22]. We find an optimal configuration
which can serve as an initial or starting profile for dynamic IDS configuration.
To identify important factors for the performance of an IDS is another crucial
investigation. In [14], Schaelicke et al. observe several architectural and system
parameters that contribute to the effectiveness of an IDS, such as operating
system structure, main memory bandwidth and latency as well as the processor
micro-architecture. Memory bandwidth and latency are identified as the most
significant contributors to sustainable throughput. CPU power is important as
well; however, it has been overlooked in the experiments due to the existence of
other closely related architectural parameters, such as deep pipelining, level of
parallelism, and caching.
In [2], the authors investigate the prediction of resource consumption based
on traffic profile. An interesting result, which we assume to be available in this
paper, is that both CPU and memory usage can be predicted with a model linear
in the number of connections. Equally important is the confirmation that the
factoring of IDS resource usage with per-analyzer and per-connection scaling is
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a reasonable assumption. The authors use this finding to build an analyzer se-
lection and configuration tool that estimates resource consumption per analyzer
to determine whether a given configuration is feasible or not. The constraint
used is a target CPU load below which the load should remain for a predefined
percentage of time. The actual selection of a feasible analyzer set is however left
as a manual task for the IDS operator. In our work, we propose a more informed
and automated way of IDS configuration decision that takes into account the
resource utilization per IDS library as well as the expected intrusion context
based on experienced attack sequences or graphs.
2.2 Attack Graphs
The generation of attack graphs has received considerable attention in the litera-
ture [6,7,9,16,17,19,21]. Sheyner et al. present in [16,17] a tool for automatically
generating attack graphs and performing different kinds of formal vulnerability
analysis on them. Attack graphs have also been used in intrusion containment.
Foo et al. develop in [3] the ADEPTS intrusion containment system in the con-
text of E-commerce environments. The system builds a graph of intrusion goals,
localizes intrusions, and deploys responses at the appropriate services to allow
the system to work with minimum overall performance degradation. The system
takes into consideration the financial impact of an attack and derives response
actions that go beyond the simple deactivation or isolation of the infected ser-
vice/host by considering interaction effects among multiple components of the
protected environment. Finally, in [10], attack graphs are used to derive optimal
IDS placement in a network so as to minimize intrusion risk. The authors de-
veloped the TVA tool (Topological Vulnerability Analysis), which can be used
to model a network and populate it with information regarding vulnerabilities.
The tool is claimed to have the ability to avoid state-space explosion through
attack graph reduction. In this paper, we assume that such knowledge of attack
graphs is given or has been acquired previously through experience.
2.3 Game-theoretical Methods
Game-theoretical methods appear to be an appropriate framework that connects
the performance evaluation of an IDS with the attack sequences or graphs on
the intruder’s side. The concepts in cooperative game theory become natural to
study the contribution of each IDS component to the attack sequence, especially
when we view a configuration as a coalition among IDS libraries.
Cooperative game theory studies the outcome of a game when coalitions
are allowed among multiple players. The concepts of the core and stable sets
are regarded as solutions to N−person cooperative games. However, the lack
of general existence theorem has led game theorists to look for other solution
concepts. Currently, indices of power such as Shapley value, Banzhaf-Coleman
index of power and their multilinear extensions have been widely used in a va-
riety of literature involving resource allocation and estimation of power in a
group of decision-making agents. In [11], examples are given on the application
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of indices of power in the analysis of presidential election games with a quan-
titative conclusion that voters in some states are assuming more power than
voters in other states in the election. In [1], Shapley value is used to allocate
profit in a multi-retailer and a single supplier cooperative game where players
can form inventory-pooling coalition. In [5], an efficient measurement allocation
in unattended ground sensor networks is suggested based on Shapley values. It
is shown that by allocating measurements proportional to the Shapley value, the
observability of localizing a target increases. A similar approach was also found
to allocate unit start-up costs among electricity consumers, load and retailers.
It appears that there has been very little work on using game theoretical
methods to study IDS configurations. Similar to the problems involving resource
allocations and presidential elections, cooperative game theory lends itself natu-
rally also to studying the relations among libraries in an adversarial environment.
3 Attacker and Detector Model
We let L = {l1, l2, · · · , lN} denote the set of a finite number of libraries and L∗
denote the set of all the possible subsets of L, with cardinality |L∗| = 2N . We let
Fi ∈ L∗, i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 2N} be a configuration set of libraries, which is a subset
of L. Each library has a cost associated with it, i.e., there is a mapping function
C : L → R+ that determines the cost of each library ci = C(li). Assuming
the cost of each library is independent of the others [2], we define the cost of
a configuration Fi by CFi = C
∗(Fi) =
∑
x∈Fi
C(x), where C∗ : L∗ → R+ is a
mapping function of configuration cost.
The attacker, on the other hand, has different types of attacks ai. Let ai ∈ A
be a specific action of attack and A = {a1, a2, · · · , aM} be the set of possible
attacks. We define a sequence of attacks Si to be a tuple of elements of A, and
A∗ be the set of all possible sequences of attacks. The order of the elements in
Si indicates a sequential strategy of an intrusion. Every attack ai ∈ A incurs a
damage di, given by the mapping function D : A → R+, i.e., di = D(ai), ∀ai ∈ A.
Assuming that the damage caused by a sequence of attacks does not depend
on the order of the sequence and the damage by one attack is independent of
other attacks, we define the damage caused by an attack sequence Si ∈ A∗ by
DSi = D
∗(Si) =
∑
x∈Si
D(x).
Each library li can only effectively detect certain attacks. We define the set
Pli ⊂ A as its scope of detection. A library li is capable of detecting an attack
ai if and only if ai ∈ Pli , otherwise the library li is sure to fail to detect. The
definition of detectability of a library configuration follows from the scope of
detection of each library.
Without losing generality, we can further assume that
⋂
li∈L
Pli = ∅ because
we can always define libraries to have functions that do not overlap with each
other. This is particularly true in practice with signature-based libraries.
Definition 1 An attack sequence Si is detectable by a library configuration Fi
if Si ⊆ Ti, where Ti := ∪lk∈FiPlk . An attack sequence Si is undetectable by Fi if
Si ⊆ T i, where T i := A \ Ti.
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Based on Definition 3, we can separate an attack sequence Si into two sep-
arate subsequences S◦i and S
⋆
i , where S
◦
i is undetectable and S
⋆
i is detectable.
These two sequences satisfy the properties that they are mutually exclusive, i.e.,
S◦i ∪ S
⋆
i = Si and S
◦
i ∩ S
⋆
i = ∅.
An example is given in Fig. 1, where we have a sequence of five attacks
a1, a2, a3, a4 and a5. Detection library l1 can be used to monitor a1 and a2
effectively whereas libraries l2 and l3 can only detect a3 and a4 respectively.
However, a5 is alien to the detection system and no library can be used to
detect a5. An IDS will rely on the successful detection of earlier known attack
stages to prevent the last unknown one.
Fig. 1. A library configuration Fi that consists of libraries l1, l2, l3 is used to detect an
attack sequence a1 → a5.
The definition of detectability assumes that each library can detect a certain
signature or anomaly-based attack with success once it is loaded. However, due
to many practical reasons such as delay and mutations of attacks, we can only
successfully detect with some true positive (TP) rate. We use αPij to denote the
probability of successful detection of an attack ai ∈ A using library lj and by
definition αPij = 0 for i not in Plj . The probability of undetected attacks when
attacks occur, or the false negative (FN) rate, is thus given by αNij = 1− αij .
We also provide a metric that measures the detectability of an attack se-
quence Si with respect to a configuration Fj , and the efficiency of detection for
Si.
Definition 2 Let function v : A∗ → R be a value function defined on attacker’s
set of sequences, satisfying
v(A1 ∪ A2) ≤ v(A1) + v(A2), (1)
where A1, A2 ∈ A
∗. Given a library component lj, its coverage Pj, and an attack
sequence Si, we define detection effectiveness, ηij ∈ [0, 1], as follows:
ηij :=
v(Si ∩ Pj)
v(Si)
. (2)
Remark 1 One simple choice of v is the cardinality of a set, i.e., v(Si) =
card(Si). We can also have more complicated value functions; for example, we
may have more weights on particular important attacks or final attacks.
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Given a configuration F which consists of a finite number of libraries, we use
definition in (3) to define detectability of an IDS configuration with respect to
an attack sequence Si as follows.
ηi :=
∑
lk∈F
ηik =
v(Si ∩ T )
v(Si)
=
∑
lk∈F
v(Si ∩ Pk)
v(Si)
. (3)
Using the concepts of TP/FN, we can weight our definition of detectability in (3)
by true positive rate αPij . Thus we have the definition of weighted detectability
as follows.
Definition 3 Given a configuration F and attack sequence Si, α
P -weighted de-
tectability is defined as
ηαi =
∑
lk∈F
αPikηik. (4)
The notion of detectability shows the effectiveness of detection configuration
Fj with respect to attack sequence Si. We will later use detectability as a metric
to optimize the performance of an IDS since higher detectability yields better
detection results.
On the other hand, we can also describe efficiency of a detection using value
function v.
Definition 4 Given an attack sequence Si and configuration F , we let ζi de-
scribe the efficiency of detection
ζi =
v(Si ∩ T )
v(T )
=
∑
lk∈F
v(Si ∩ Pk)
v(T )
, (5)
and let ζαi denote the weighted detection efficiency given by
ζαi =
∑
lk∈F
αPik
v(Si ∩ Pk)
v(T )
. (6)
where T is a coverage of configuration F .
Proposition 5 With (1) and the metrics ηi and ζi defined in (3) and (5) re-
spectively, we have the following relation between these two metrics:
1
ηi
+
1
ζi
≤ 1, ∀i ∈ A∗. (7)
Proof. Using the definitions in (3), (5) and (1), we arrive at
1
ηi
+
1
ζi
=
v(Si) + v(T )
v(Si ∩ T )
≤
v(Si ∪ T )
v(Si ∩ T )
≤ 1. (8)
The inequality (7) provides a fundamental tradeoff relationship between de-
tectability and efficiency.
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4 Cooperative Game Model
In this section, we review essential concepts of indices of power and use them
in the context of optimal default IDS configuration. We can view each possible
configuration as a coalition of different libraries and hence each library can be
associated with an index of power, signifying its contribution to the detection of
intrusions.
We introduce the notion of ω-effective detection to quantity the goal of in-
trusion detection.
Definition 6 We call a configuration F of an IDS ω−effective for attack se-
quence Si if the detectability does not fall below ω, that is ηi ≥ ω, and (ω, α)−effective
if the weighted detectability does not fall below ω, that is ηαi ≥ ω.
Parameter ω is a level of intrusion detection performance an IDS wants to
achieve. We call a configuration goal achieving if it is (ω, α)-effective, and un-
satisfactory otherwise.
4.1 Shapley Values and B-C index
To describe an N -person cooperative game using game-theoretical language, we
let L be the set of the players, and any subset of L, or a configuration F ∈ L∗,
be a coalition. We let f : L∗ → {0, 1} be a characteristic function of the game
having basic properties that
(P1) f(∅) = 0;
(P2) f(F1 ∪ F2) ≥ f(F1) + f(F2), F1, F2 ∈ L∗ and F1 ∩ F2 = ∅;
(P3) f({i}) = 0, for all i ∈ L.
(P4) f(L) = 1.
By having the characteristic function f taking values 0 and 1 only, we have
defined a simple game. The value 1 from the mapping f of a coalition or con-
figuration means a winning or goal achieving library configuration, whereas the
value 0 yields a non-winning or unsatisfactory library configuration.
A carrier of the cooperative game is a library which does not contribute to
any configurations to attain the goal of detection. Mathematically, a carrier is a
coalition, Fc ∈ L∗, such that f(F ) = f(F ∩Fc), for all F . We can always remove
from our library list those dummy libraries which do not contribute or disregard
them in our cooperative game when they are found to be carriers.
The Shapley value of the i-th library li is given by φi, for all li ∈ L.
φi =
∑
R⊂L
(r − 1)!(N − r)!
N !
[f(R)− f(R− {li})] (9)
The Shapley value φi given in (9) evaluates the contribution of each library
toward achieving ω−effective detection. Since the characteristic mapping f only
takes value in 0 and 1, Shapley value can be further simplified into
φi =
∑
R′⊂L
(r − 1)!(N − r)!
N !
, (10)
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where, for a given li, R
′ is the winning coalition such that the configuration can
achieve ω−effectiveness with li ∈ R′, whereas R′ −{li} fails to achieve the goal.
With a smaller scale problem, Shapley value is relatively easy to compute. How-
ever, in large problems, the evaluation of the weights can create computational
overhead and the complexity increases exponentially with the size of the library.
An easier index of power to compute is the Banzhaf-Coleman index of power,
or B-C index, which depends on counting the number of swings, i.e., number of
coalitions or configurations that wins when li is included but loses when is not.
Definition 7 (B-C Index, [11]) The normalized Banzhaf-Coleman index βi, ∀li ∈
L is given by
βi =
θi∑N
j=1 θj
, (11)
where θi is the number of swings for li; a swing for li ∈ L is a set R ⊂ L such
that R is a goal-achieving configuration if li ∈ R, and R− {li} is not.
Shapley value and B-C index are closely related. They can both be evaluated
by multilinear extension (see Section 5). The difference lies in the weighting co-
efficients used. In Shapley value, the weights are varied according to the coalition
size, whereas in the B-C index, the weights are all equal.
4.2 An Example
Suppose we are given an attack sequence Si as depicted in Fig. 1, where we have
five attack actions ordered by a1 → a2 → a3 → a4 → a5. There are 3 libraries
and the sets Pli , i = 1, 2, 3 are given as follows: Pl1 = {l1, l2}, Pl2 = {l3}, Pl3 =
{l4}. It is obvious that the sequence Si can only be partially detected as a5 is alien
to the existing libraries of the IDS system. Suppose that each library has TP rates
equal to 1 and v is the cardinality of the set. We can use Shapley value and B-C
index to quantify the contribution to the detection of the sequence Si. Let ω =
3/5. The set of swings for l1, l2 and l3 are {(l1, l2), (l1, l3), (l1, l2, l3)}, {(l1, l2)},
and {(l1, l3)}, respectively. The Shapley values are thus given by φ1 =
1
3
, φ2 =
1
6
,
and φ3 =
1
6
; and the B-C indices are thus β1 =
3
5
, β2 =
1
5
, and β3 =
1
5
. To achieve
ω = 3
5
level of detection, l1 is most important and l2 and l3 are equally important.
Therefore, in terms of the priority of loading libraries, l1 should be placed first
and then one should consider l2 and l3. Such evaluation via Shapley value and
BC-index is useful for IDS system to assess the influence of each library and make
decisions on which libraries to load initially when cost constraints are present.
5 Multiple Attack Sequences and Multinear Extension
In section 4, we introduced a cooperative game and proposed the concept of
ω−effectiveness to determine the winning or losing coalitions for a given known
sequence. In this section, we extend this framework to deal with multiple coop-
erative games with respect to different sequences in an attack graph. We look at
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multilinear extensions in this section for two reasons: one is that it can be used
to approximate the Shapley value when the library size grows; and the other
reason is that it is a general framework that can yield B-C index.
5.1 Multilinear Extension (MLE)
A multilinear extension is a continuous function that can be used to evaluate
Shapley value and B-C index as special cases. We let each library li ∈ L be
associated with a continuous variable xi ∈ [0, 1], and fj be a characteristic
function for detecting particular attack sequence Sj ∈ A∗. We now introduce
the multilinear extension for an attack sequence Sj, denoted by hj , as follows:
Definition 8 The multilinear extension of the cooperative game with character-
istic function fj is a function hj : [0, 1]
N → R++ given by
hj(x1, x2, · · · , xN ) =
∑
R⊂L
{∏
li∈R
xi
∏
li∈L−R
(1− xi)
}
fj(R). (12)
The function hj can be used to evaluate Shapley’s value by (13) below and
B-C index by (14) below.
φij =
∫ 1
0
∂hj(x1, x2, · · · , xN )
∂xi
∣∣∣∣∣
x1=t,x2=t,··· ,xN=t
dt, (13)
βij =
∂hj(x1, x2, · · · , xN )
∂xi
∣∣∣∣∣
x1=
1
2
,x2=
1
2
,··· ,xN=
1
2
, (14)
where φij and βij are the Shapley value and B-C index of library li for detecting
sequence Sj , respectively. The set M is a subset of A∗ that models a set of
attacks known to detectors.
To aggregate the effect of a library of detecting a set of sequences M⊂ A∗,
we define an aggregated MLE h¯ as a sum of MLEs over all the sequences, as
follows
h¯ =
∑
Sj∈M
pjhj , (15)
where pj is a weight on hj , indicating the frequency of occurrence of the attack
sequence Si. It is a normalized parameter that satisfies pj ≥ 0 and
∑
Sj∈M
pj =
1.
Proposition 9 The Shapley value φi for detecting multiple sequences is given
by
φi =
∑
Sj∈M
pjφij , (16)
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and B-C index βi for detecting multiple sequences is given by
βi =
∑
Sj∈M
pjβij =
∑
Sj∈M
(
pjθij∑N
k=1 θkj
)
, (17)
where θij is the number swings for detecting sequence Sj.
Proof. The proposition can be proved using the linearity of MLE.
5.2 Multilinear Approximation
As is well known, the multilinear extension in (12) has a probabilistic interpre-
tation and it can be used to approximate the indices of power when the number
of libraries grows large. We can view the variable xi ∈ [0, 1] as the probability
of a library li in a random coalition S ⊂ L such that fj(S) = 1 when li ∈ S,
and fj(S) = 0 otherwise. Since the event that a library is in a random coali-
tion is independent from the event of other libraries in a coalition, we have that
the probability of forming the random coalition S as a particular coalition R is
given by P(S = R) =
∏
li∈R
xi
∏
li∈L−R
(1 − xi). The definition in (12) can be
interpreted as the expectation of f(S), i.e., hj(x1, x2, · · · , xN ) = E(fj(S)).
Let Zj be a random variable such that
Zj =
{∑
i∈M ηij =: η
S
j , if lj ∈ S
0 if lj ∈ L − S
(18)
and let Y be another random variable defined by Y =
∑
lj∈S
ηSj =
∑
lj∈S,j 6=i
Zj .
Since Zj’s are independent, Y has the mean and variance
µ(Y ) =
∑
j 6=i,lj∈S
ηSj xj , (19)
σ2(Y ) =
∑
j 6=i,lj∈S
ηSj xj(1 − xj). (20)
Hence, hi(x1, · · · , xN ) is the probability that a coalition wins to be ω-effective
with respect to a set of sequencesM but loses if li is removed from the coalition.
From the definition of ω-effectiveness, we can express hi as
hi(x1, x2, · · · , xN ) = P(ω ≤ Y ≤ ω + η
S
i ) (21)
When the size of the library grows, the random variable Y can be approximated
by a normal random variable Y¯ , with mean and variance given in (19) and (20).
Hence,
hi(x1, x2, · · · , xN ) = P
(
ω −
1
2
≤ Y¯ ≤ ω + ηSi −
1
2
)
. (22)
The Shapley value can thus be computed from (13) and (15) by hi(t, t, · · · , t)
with the random variable Y¯ having the mean and variance µ(Y¯ ) = t
∑
j 6=i η
S
j
and σ2(Y¯ ) = t(1− t)
∑
j 6=i η
S
j , respectively. The B-C value can be approximated
by evaluating hi(t, t, · · · , t) at t =
1
2
using (22).
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5.3 Optimal Default Configuration
The indices of power rank the importance of each library from high to low. We
can make use of these indices to make a decision on which libraries to load when
the system is subject to some cost constraint C0. Toward that end, we arrive at
an integer programming problem as follows:
max
z
∑
li∈L
ziφi (23)
s.t.
∑
li∈L
zici ≤ C0
zi ∈ {0, 1}, ∀li ∈ L
We can use the B-C index as well in the objective function. The optimization
problem (23) can be viewed as a knapsack problem [8]. The knapsack problem is
well-known to be NP-complete. However, there is a pseudo-polynomial time al-
gorithm using dynamic programming and a fully polynomial-time approximation
scheme, which invokes the pseduo-polynomial time algorithm as a subroutine.
5.4 An Example
In this section, we continue with the example in Section 4.2, but with an extended
attack tree depicted in Fig. 2. The libraries that can be used for detection are
l1, l2, l3 and l4 whose coverages are Pl1 = {a1, a2}, Pl2 = {a3, a7}, Pl3 = {a4, a8}
and Pl4 = {a6}, respectively. There are 4 known attack sequences in the attack
tree. Let S1 be the sequence a1 → a2 → a3 → a4 → a5; S2 denote a1 → a2 → a6;
S3 denote a1 → a2 → a3 → a7; and S4 be a1 → a2 → a3 → a4 → a8.
Fig. 2. Attack tree with attacks aj , j = 1, 2, · · · , 8, and libraries li, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, that
are used to detect attacks.
The Shapley values and B-C indices are summarized in the Table 1 and Table
2, respectively. Suppose each library is equally expensive with 1 unit per library.
With the capacity constraint being 2 units, we can load library l1 and l2 to
optimize the default library. This choice is intuitively plausible because l1 and l2
covers the major routes in the attack tree. l4 does not contribute to the result of
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detection as much as other libraries, and when ω = 3
5
, the impact of l4 becomes
negligible when l1 is used. When the size of the tree grows, we need to evaluate
indices of power in an automated fashion and use a polynomial-time algorithm
to find the solution to the knapsack problem (23).
Sequences l1 l2 l3 l4
S1
1
3
1
6
1
3
0
S2 1 0 0 0
S3
1
2
1
2
0 0
S4
1
3
1
3
1
3
0
Table 1. Shapley value for the attack tree
Sequences l1 l2 l3 l4
S1
3
5
1
5
1
5
0
S2 1 0 0 0
S3
1
2
1
2
0 0
S4
1
3
1
3
1
3
0
Table 2. B-C index for the attack tree
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have adopted a cooperative game approach to study the in-
fluence of each library when forming a configuration or a coalition to detect
intrusions according to some known attack graphs. We have used the game ap-
proach to connect the detector and the attacker, and developed novel notions of
detectability and efficacy of detection. The paper has described the applications
of Shapley value and B-C index in a combinatorial knapsack optimization prob-
lem, which gives rise to an optimal configuration under the resource and cost
constraints. The multilinear extension offers a technique to generalize the two
indices discussed in the paper and, in addition, offers an approach to estimate
these values when the number of libraries grows.
14 Q. Zhu and T. Bas¸ar
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